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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW: Banishment as Alternative to Prison Confine-
ment for Crime. The defendant appeals from a judgment putting
into effect a two-year road sentence which had been suspended on
the condition that he leave the State of North Carolina and not re-
turn for a period of two years. The conditional sentence resulted
from a plea of guilty to a charge of criminal assault with a deadly
weapon. The defendant left the state; however, it was established
that he did return upon two occasions during the period of suspen-
sion. The defendant contends that the sentence is invalid since it
allows departure from the state as an alternative to confinement. On
appeal, HELD: Reversed and remanded for resentencing. A sen-
tence of banishment is undoubtedly void. A sentence of two years
on the roads suspended on the condition that the defendant leave the
state and not return for a period of two years is in all practical
effect a sentence of banishment for two years. State v. Doughtie,
237 N. C. 434, 74 S. E. 2d 925 (1953).
In the absence of specific statutory or constitutional authority, the
practice of banishment of a citizen, either as a direct or alternative
judgment, has been held to be void. State v. Baker, 58 S. C. 111,
36 S. E. 501 (1900); State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751
(1892) ; People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N. W. 95, 70 A. L. R.
98 (1930); Millsaps v. Strauss, 208 Ark. 265, 185 S. W. 2d 933
(1945); Bernstein v. Jennings, 231 Iowa 1280, 4 N. W. 2d 428
(1942). A sentence which required that the defendant leave a cer-
tain county within the jurisdiction of the court is void. State v.
Hoggett, 101 Miss. 269, 57 So. 811 (1942). A municipal corpora-
tion was declared powerless to enact an ordinance which required
prostitutes leave and remain away from a certain city. Paralee v.
Camden, 49 Ark. 165, 4 Am. St. Rep. 35 (1886). The practice of
banishment was unknown at common law and whenever practiced,
it assumed the form of a Royal Pardon, granted by the King through
statutes enacted by Parliament. HAWKINS, PLEAS OP THlE CROWN
507 (8th ed.). Among the reasons cited for the voiding of either a
direct or alternative sentence of banishment are: first, it is against
public policy, exceeds the sovereign power of a State and is likely
to invoke retaliation among the States. People v. Baum, supra.
Second, it is an alternative judgment, and is thus voided. State v.
Hatley, supra. It has been declared to be unusual punishment, though
not "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Constitutional
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provisions embodied in State and Federal Constitutions. People V.
Baum, supra. It was not regarded as "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment at common law. People v. Baum, supra. While a sentence em-
bracing banishment is regarded as ground for reversal and remand-
ing to the lower court, the invalidity does not extend beyond the
sentence and the defect is corrected by a new sentence. State v.
Baker, supra. The void part of the sentence may be stricken out
without affecting the remainder of the sentence. People v. Lopez,
81 Cal. App. 199, 253 Pac. 169 (1927). In many states, the practice
of banishment is permitted in the form of a conditional pardon issued
by the Governor, through power vested either by the Constitutior;
or statute. The reasoning in such action is that a person may either
accept or reject the contingent condition. State v. Barnes, 32 S. C.
14, 10 S. E. 611 (1890) ; Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S. W.
106 (1895); Ex Parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1833).
Banishment by the courts of the land is now, and has been, through
the period covering the birth of the modem law, void. In ancient
as well as present day primitive society, banishment is a virtual pro-
nouncement of the death penalty, since under many circumstances,
the individual cannot survive outside the group. In modern, present-
day society, however, the penalty attached to such a sentence has
virtually lost all of its severity. It does not answer a problem, it
merely transfers it to another jurisdiction. The purposes behind
banishing an offender are numerous, but outstanding among these
is the desire of the court to avoid the severe penalties involved in
imprisonment and its repercussions, and to force a change in environ-
ment upon the offender in hope time and change in environment
might bring about the desired result. This is laudable where it can
be established that the end result would be beneficial. The second
result sought is simply to rid the state of a problem and let some
other area of society shoulder the burden. This is neither sound nor
safe. The good which comes from this practice is not sufficient to
offset the evil, and the North Carolina court in the instant case
properly refused to permit the practice.
DEXTER HAMILTON.
SPECIFIC PEBFOIBMANCE: Discretion of the Court. Owner
contracted in writing with appellant to devise premises to him if he
would live with and take care of the respondent, owner's sister and
appellant's aunt, on condition that appellant outlive the respondent,
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Approximately four months later owner died without making the
agreed testamentary provision, the failure to do so being the result
of pure inadvertence. Relations between respondent aid appellant
were harmonious for approximately two years and the arrangement
was working satisfactorily; however, friction subsequently arose.
Respondent, having title to premises by will of owner and conveyance
from two other heirs, brought an action in ejectment against appell-
ant. The appellant counterclaimed for specific performance of the
contract and asked to be declared owner in fee simple of said pre-
mises. Lower court held that appellant had forfeited all of his rights
under the contract and should be permanently barred of any future
relief. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed in part. Appellant is not
permanently barred of his right to future relief, but there is no pre-
sent right to specific performance. Flowers v. Roberts, 220 S. C. 110,
60 S. E. 2d 612 (1951).
It is well settled that the granting of specific performance is not a
matter of absolute right, but rests in the sound or judicial discretion
of equity, Lesesne v. Witte, 5 S. C. 450 (1874), guided by established
principles, and exercised on consideration of all the circumstances
of each particular case. Mobley v. Quattlebaum, 101 S. C. 221, 85
S. E. 585 (1914); Mitchum v. Mitchum, 183 S. C. 75, 190 S. E.
104 (1936). It was held in the case of Marthinson v. McCutchen,
84 S. C. 256, 66 S. E. 120 (1908), that equity would not decree spe-
cific performance of hard and unconscionable bargains, nor ones
where the price was grossly inadequate. In the case of Holley v.
Anness, 41 S. C. 349, 19 S. E. 646 (1893), the court said the con-
tract must be certain, for valuable consideration, perfectly fair, free
from misrepresentation or misapprehension, fraud or mistake, im-
position or surprise, before it would decree specific performance.
Also, unless the contract is fair, just, equitable, and expresses the
true agreement of the parties, specific performance will not be granted.
Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S. C. 5, 18 S. E. 2d 584 (1942). This
discretion of equity is not an arbitrary or capricious one, but must
be governed by the rules of equity, Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 1 Des. Eq.
250 (S. C. 1792) ; Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S. C. 427,
23 S. E. 2d 372 (1942) ; and a fair contract entered into openly and
aboveboard will be enforced. New v. Collins, 126 S. C. 294, 119
S. B. 835 (1922). When these requirements of equity are met
there is a right to a decree of specific performance. "Unless the
denial of specific performance can be based upon some fixed princi-
ple of equitable jurisprudence, the denial is arbitrary and capricious,
1953]
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and is violative of a plain legal right." Sumner v. Bankhead, 119
S. C. 78, 11 S. E. 891 (1921) (Mr. Justice Cothran dissenting), cited
with approval in Welling v. Crosland, 129 S. C. 127, 123 S. E. 776
(1923). Some jurisdictions have held that, even though discretion-
ary, if the proper conditions for specific performance do exist, per-
formance will be decreed as a matter of right and not as a matter
of favor, Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. 2d 736 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Schmidt
v. Barr, 333 Ill. 494, 165 N. E. 131 (1929), or as much a matter
of right as legal relief of damages, Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v.
Municipal Gas Co., 38 F. 2d 444 (10th Cir. 1930).
It is established that a decree of specific performance in South
Carolina is not a matter of right, but is left in the sound or judicial
discretion of equity, and that this discretion is controlled by the
settled rules of equity. These rules have become so well-settled that
it is somewhat misleading to use the term "discretion" with regard
to granting specific performance. It may be that the term is habitu-
ally used simply to indicate that the case before the court is to be
governed by well-established equitable principles, and not by legal
rules; nevertheless, the term is still misleading, for when a satisfac-
tory case for specific performance is made out it must be granted
and is not dependent upon any discretionary power as that term is
ordinarily used. As Mr. Justice Cothran stated in his dissent in the
Sumner case, supra, ".... unless the granting of the remedy offend
one or more of these fixed principles, the plaintiff has a legal right
to the remedy". If there is a legal right by the meeting of the es-
tablished principles of equity, there is no discretion. If there is a
legal right and no discretion, there must be an absolute right. It
seems, therefore, that "discretion", as used in these cases, is some-
what inaccurate and misleading, since in effect an absolute right exists.
WmLAM H. BALLZNGER.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: Right of Child to Attack Validity
of Divorce Decree. In an action under the Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act for death of claimant's father, the first wife of
deceased entered a claim on behalf of her minor son only. Said claim
attacked as void a Nevada divorce decree obtained by deceased on
the grounds that he was domiciled in that state, claimant's mother
being constructively served in the Nevada proceedings. The Indus-
trial Commission entered award in favor of the son as sole dependent.
On appeal, HELD: Reversed. The son could not collaterally attack
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the divorce decree in workmen's compensation proceedings and the
award should be divided between the second wife as deceased's
lawful wife and the son as his dependent child. Evans v. Asphalt
Roads Materials Company, 72 S. E. 2d 321 (Va. 1952).
Generally a stranger to a divorce proceeding may not attack it
either directly or collaterally, unless he had some pre-existing right,
Davis v. Mitchel, 27 Tenn. App. 182, 178 S. W. 2d 889 (1944),
which was prejudiced by the rendering of the decree. Mageveny v.
Karsch, 167 Tenn. 32, 65 S. W. 2d 562, 92 A. L. R. 343 (1933);
Miller v. Miller, 89 Kan. 151, 130 Pac. 681 (1913). A child is a
stranger to a divorce proceeding, McLeod v. McLeod, 144 Ga. 359,
87 S. E. 286 (1928); however, a few jurisdictions allow collateral
attacks by a child on the ground that the child was not a party to the
divorce suit and can attack the decree regardless of its validity be-
tween the parties thereto. Matter of Lindgren's Estate, 293 N. Y.
18, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944). The departure from the general rule
may be explained as a desire on the part of the courts to prevent
a gross injustice to the wife, Mintz v. Mintz, 83 Pa. 95 (1925), or to
protect the rights of a child, Rawlins v. Rawlins, 18 Fla. 345 (1885),
or to protect a child's legitimacy. Henley v. Poster, 220 Ala. 420, 125
So. 662 (1930). There has been a tendency in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court to open the doors to collateral attack
by a stranger to the divorce proceedings. A chronological listing is
helpful to better show this tendency. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S.
562 (1906), holds that the mere domicile within the state of the
party seeking the divorce does not entitle it to full faith and credit
in other states in cases in which the adverse party was a non-resident
and was constructively served but did not appear. Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), overruled the Haddock case and
held that such a decree, granted in a case where one spouse did not
appear, must be accorded full faith and credit, and that although the
question of domicile in the granting state must be accorded prima
facie weight, this question can be relitigated in a sister state. In
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), a case arising
from the same state of facts that gave rise to the first Williams case
cited above, the Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of the first
Williams case, stating: ". . . but those not parties to a litigation
ought not to be foreclosed by the interested actions of others, es-
pecially not a state which is concerned with the vindication of its
own policy". This case further states that full faith and credit must
be accorded if the case was litigated in a truly adverse manner on
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the merits and issues in the granting state; moreover, the limitation
in the above rule applies to strangers or parties to the proceedings,
but does not preclude the state's attack at any time. Three years
later, following the rule in the second Williams case, the Supreme
Court in two cases refused to allow a spouse the right to attack on
jurisdictional grounds where the contesting spouse made an appear-
ance and contested the domicile of the spouse seeking the divorce.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378
(1948). A divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit where
the second spouse was constructively served but did not appear, in-
sofar as it affects the marital status, but it is ineffective on the issue
of alimony granted by a previous decree of separate maintenance in
the state of matrimonial domicile. Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541
(1948). A divorce decree cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdic-
tion by a child who is a stranger to the proceedings where the father
was a party to the proceedings and was barred from such attack by
state law. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951). Where
domicile is put into issue and either contested or admitted by defen-
dant spouse, or where defendant is personally served in the divorce
state, the defendant spouse and strangers are barred from collateral
attacks in a sister state, unless a less stringent rule of res judicata is
applied to the stranger than to the parties to the divorce. Cook v.
Cook, 342 U. S. 126 (1951). A decree rendered without personal
jurisdiction over defendant is entitled to full faith and credit, but
may be collaterally attacked by interested parties. May v. Anderson,
73 Sup. Ct. 840 (1953).
It would seem that the door is wide open for the state to collater-
ally attack on jurisdictional grounds a divorce rendered in a sister
state, and partially open for others, including children, to so attack.
This tendency was not recognized in the principal case, and the court
adhered strictly to the general rule. From available cases, it would
appear that South Carolina follows the general rule in not allowing
collateral attacks by children whose pre-existing rights were not pre-
judiced. Watson v. Watson, 172 S. C. 362, 174 S. E. 33 (1934).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has not decided this question
since the first Williams case started a change in the Supreme Court's
requirements for full faith and credit in divorce cases. It is pre-
dicted that South Carolina will stay within the majority rule ex-
pressed in the outstanding Watson case, there being no necessary
reasons why a child should be allowed to attack the divorce decree
in South Carolina. All of the eventualities such as illegitimacy and
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care of the child are provided for by statute. It is considered, how-
ever, that our courts would not hesitate to allow an attack upon
grounds that the parents collusively obtained a divorce to take from
the child some devise, wealth, or other valuable material asset. Gen-
erally, to allow a child to succeed in his attack upon a divorce decree
would serve only to call public attention to the private affairs of the
individual, and if there were children of the second union, to bas-
tardize them. Furthermore the right to dower, peace of mind, and
other kindred rights overbalance and outweigh any rights a child
might have acquired subsequent to the divorce.
CLm H. TU1mlR.
TAXATION: Sale of Land with Unmatured Crops Thereon -
Capital Gain or Ordinary Income? The taxpayer and her brothers
were the owners of an orange grove which they sold in August
1944 for $197,100. The oranges were mature and ready to be
picked in early November. Basing the value of the oranges on es-
timates and appraisals, the purchaser valued the unmatured crop at
$120,000. The taxpayer and her husband filed a joint return and
reported her one-third interest at a net gain of $48,819.82, fifty per
cent of which was included in taxable income as a long-term capital
gain. No portion of the taxpayer's share of the selling price of
the ranch was allocated to the growing oranges on the trees at the
time of the sale. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed
a deficiency against the taxpayer, holding that the unmatured oranges
were not real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business;
and further that the crop constituted property held by taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of her trade
or business. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The sale of land
with unmatured crops thereon prior to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950, is treated as ordinary income as to the portion
allocable to unmatured crops. Watson v. Commissioner, 73 Sup.
Ct. 848 (1953).
In determining gains and losses from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty used in the trade or business under the provisions of Section
117 (j) of Internal Revenue Code, the term "property" means prop-
erty of a character which is held for more than 6 months and which
is not properly included in the inventory or held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness. The courts have given this section conflicting construction
19531
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as to whether profits from unmattred crops constitute a capital gain
or ordinary income. Some of the courts have followed the common
law of the states in which the case arose, holding that growing crops
are a part of the realty, therefore subject to treatment as a capital
gain. Owen v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1951);
McCoy v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 486 (10th Cir. 1951). Unharvested
crops are not property properly includible in an inventory of taxpayer
if on hand at the end of the year, Irrgang v. Commissioner, 94 F. Supp.
206 (S. D. Fla. 1950); and the taxpayer does not hold unmatured
crops primarily for sale in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness. Irrgang v. Commissioner, supra; McCoy v. Commissioner,
supra. But in the case of Cole v. Smyth, 96 F. Supp. 745 (S. D.
Calif. 1951), the sale of an orange grove with unmatured fruit on
the trees was held to be subject to capital gain treatment on the
grounds that there was no ready market for the oranges and no lend-4
ing institution would consider making a loan on the crop. The
amount allocable to the unmatured fruit in the sale of an apple or-
chard has been held subject to taxation as ordinary income. Miller
v. Commissioner, 10 T. Ct. 210 (1951). Section 117(j) of the
Code was amended by Section 323 (a) (2) of the Revenue Act of
1951, specifically providing that immature crops, when sold with real
estate, shall be treated as part of the real estate for the purpose of
computing capital gains. Section 24 of the Code, relating to items
not deductible, was amended by- Section 323(b) (1) of the same Act,
so as to allow no deductions for depreciation or expenses otherwise
incurred in regard to unharvested crops coming under the provisions
of Section 117(j)(3) of the Code. T.D. 5980 (1953) provides
that the basis of such crops shall be increased by the amount of the
items attributable to the production of such crops and that any other
property shall be decreased by the amount of any such items which
are allocable to such property, notwithstanding any provision of
Section 113(b) (1), relating to basis for determining gain or loss,
to the contrary.
The instant case in affirming the decision of the lower court con-
strued the intention of Congress in enacting this amendment to Sec-
tion 117(j) to be corrective, therefore holding that, under the then
existing Code, unmatured crops sold with the land were subject to
treatment as ordinary income. Congress did not make the amendment
retroactive to taxable years beginning before January 1, 1951, and the
Senate Finance Committee's report stated that there would be an es-
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timated loss of $3 million annually under the amendment. It is thus
evident that Congress intended not simply a clarification but a change
of position in enacting Section 323 of the Revenue Act of 1951.
JAMVS M. MoiUs.
PROPERTY - ADVERSE POSSESSION: Interruption of Period
by Holder's Creation as Tenant-in-Common. In proceedings for
partition of land the plaintiffs alleged that they were tenants-in-
common with defendants, title having descended to the parties as the
sole heirs of a sister who died intestate and without issue. Defen-
dants denied the tenancy-in-common and pleaded sole seizin by vir-
tue of an adverse holding of the land for more than twenty years.
Upon trial there was a verdict for plaintiffs on the grounds that the
record title to the land was in the plaintiffs and defendants as heirs,
and that defendant's possession was insufficient to vest title thereto
in themselves. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. By operation of
law, twenty years adverse possession after the death of the owner
would be required to vest sole title in defendants as against cotenants.
Wilson v. Wilson, 74 S. E. 2d 704 (N. C. 1953).
Adverse possession has been defined as the open and notorious pos-
session and occupation of real property under an evident claim of
right. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Searson, 137 S. C. 468, 135
S. E. 567 (1943). It is universally established that the adverse
possession must be continued during the time necessary to create
a bar under the statute of limitations. Fordson Coal Co. v. Collins,
268 Ky. 331, 104 S. W. 2d 985 (1937) ; Bland v. Beasley, 145 N. C.
168, 58 S. E. 993 (1907). Indeed, continuity is the very essence of
this mode of acquiring title and any substantial interruption of this
continuity will be fatal to the claim. Turnipseed v. Busby, 1 McCord
279 (S. C. 1821) ; McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich. 68 (S. C. 1850). The
failure of any one of the requirements, siz., actual, visible, exclusive
and hostile, will interrupt the continuity of the holding. Frick v.
Harper, 155 Ala. 231, 46 So. 453 (1908); Bean v. Bean, 163 Mich.
379, 128 N. W. 413 (1910). In the instant case the creation of the
defendants as tenants-in-common with the other heirs was held to
constitute an interruption of the continuity of possession. This hold-
ing must presumably have been based on the absence of at least one
of the mentioned elements. To analyze this decision, therefore, it
is necessary to examine the characteristics of tenancy-in-common.
Tenancy-in-common is the holding of an estate in land by several
1953]
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persons by separate and distinct titles, there being unity of posses-
sion only. Altobelli v. Montesi, 300 Mass. 396, 15 N. E. 2d 463
(1938); Appeal of Delashmutt, 234 Iowa 1255, 15 N. W. 2d 619
(1944). Each tenant owns an undivided, .hence unknown, portion
of the land and therefore is entitled before severance to an interest
in every portion. Martin v. Bouie, 37 S. C. 102, 119, 15 S. E. 736
(1892); Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y. 244, 23 N. E. 376 (1890).
Each tenant has the right to occupy the land, and the possession of
one tenant is presumed to be the possession of all, until the con-
trary appears. Clary v. Hatton, 152 N. C. 107, 67 S. R. 258 (1910) ;
Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S. C. 99, 59 S. E. 2d 850 (1950). A cotenant,
however, may acquire title by adverse possession as against the others
by unequivocal acts repudiating their rights so as to amount to an
ouster of them during the statutory period. Crews v. Crews, 192
N. C. 679, 686, 135 S. E. 784 (1926) ; Wells v. Coursey, 197 S. C.
483, 15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941). Therefore, it is clear that in the case
under analysis the defendants could have been holding adversely as
to their cotenants after the time of the sister's death. Then why
could not the periods be tacked? The case does not explain this
question. With the exception of Winstead v. Woolard, 223 N. C.
814, 28 S. E. 2d 507 (1944), the cases cited as precedents merely
apply the ruling seemingly without analysis. And though the Win-
stead case differs from the instant case in that the court found, by
way of fiction, that the defendant had not been in possession prior
to the ancestor's death, a feasible explanation for the holding in the
instant case may be constructed from its premises. This explanation
would be that, by operation of law at the sister's death intestate, the
defendants were put in possession of the land as cotenants with the
plaintiffs and could not repudiate their right to the inheritance so
as to be in possession other than by their real title. Winstead v.
Woolard, supra; Nixon v. Williams, 95 N. C. 103 (1886). There-
fore, under the well-settled principle that the possession of one co-
tenant is in law the possession of all, the period of holding thereafter
would inure to the benefit of the cotenants for any holding less than
the statutory period. Bullin v. Hancock, 138 N. C. 198, 50 S. E.
621 (1905).
On these grounds the decision in the instant case would be in ac-
cord with the unanimously recognized and fundamental principles
of adverse possession and tenancy-in-common. However, the vast
majority of the cases have not directly analyzed the holding and have
thought it sufficient to merely rule that the creation of the claimant
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as a tenant-in-common does interrupt the running of the statute.
Perhaps it has been considered too fundamental, but in any event
this scarcity of analysis may leave room for variation should a like
case arise in this jurisdiction.
LUoY M. SmITH.
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